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Abstract 
In traditional group key transfer protocol, the key generation center randomly selects a session key and then 
transports it that has been encrypted by another secret key. Afterwards, scholars construct authenticated key transfer 
protocols based on secret sharing instead of encryption algorithm. One typical protocol of this style is built by using 
the secret sharing scheme based on Language’s interpolation polynomial. In this paper, we utilize an optimized secret 
sharing scheme instead of Language’s interpolation polynomial. We provide mutual authentication to ensure that only 
the authorized group members can recover the right session key. What’s more, all participants only need to store one 
secret share for all sessions. Besides, the change of the group members has no effect on the validity of the existing 
shares, which means the existing shares possess the excellent characteristic “one time assign, many times apply”. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
In group communication, sharing a session key among all participants before exchanging 
communication messages is an important means to protect private information of the group members. 
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Thus, the group key management protocol, which devotes to solving this problem, plays a significant role 
in secure communication. Generally speaking, group key management protocols can be classified into two 
categories: the distributed group key management protocol and the centralized group key management 
protocol. In the distributed group key management protocols, all group members should contribute to the 
generation and distribution of the session key. Therefore, the time cost is inevitably too high, especially in 
the event of large number of participants. To break this encumbrance, we often assume that there is a 
group key generation center KGC managing the entire group. With the help of KGC, the execute 
efficiency is greatly improved. Thus, the centralized group key management protocol becomes the most 
widely used group key management protocol. In 1997, Harney et al. [1] proposed a group key 
management protocol that requires )(no  encryptions to update a group key with n members when there 
comes a new user or someone is evicted. Subsequently, Fiat and Naor [2] put forward a k-resistant 
protocol which allows up to k users’ collaboration. However, it is still not satisfying since each entity has 
to store )loglog( nkko keys and the server must broadcast )loglog( 22 nkko messages for key 
update. 
For reducing the number of stored keys and broadcasted messages, researchers introduced secret 
sharing to the group key distribution protocol [2–5]. Typically, Lein Harn and Changlu Lin [6] construct 
an protocol by employing secret sharing based on Language’s interpolation polynomial. Each user has to 
reconstruct the t-degree interpolating polynomial by t+1 points. Therefore, it is only suitable for a small 
group. 
In this paper, the appropriate use of secret sharing based on discrete logarithm problem makes group 
members get the group key more conveniently and securely. Compared with previous ones, our protocol 
only needs the server to broadcast n+1 messages at once in a round of distribution. What’s more, all of the 
legal users only need to store one secret share in all conversations regardless of new addition or someone’ 
walkout. That is, when refreshing a group key or carrying out a new conversation, the original entities 
who are also included in current business need not to change their existing secret shares in case of 
members have changed. Besides, in the aspect of computation, it no longer needs to reconstruct the t-
degree interpolating polynomial now. Just a simple computation is enough for each user to obtain the key. 
2. Preliminaries 
The discrete logarithm problem: Let G be a group with a generator g. The discrete logarithm problem 
for the group G can be stated as [7]: Given Gg∈ and Ga∈ , find an integer x  such that ag x = . In 
this paper, we assume that the discrete logarithm problem is hard, that is, 
DLP: Given Gg∈ and Ga∈ , it is computationally intractable to find an integer x such that ag x = .
Secret Sharing: Secret sharing is one of the basic building blocks in modern cryptographic literature [8–
10]. Generally speaking, a secret sharing protocol consists of two phases, called sharing and 
reconstruction. Informally, in a (m, n)-secret sharing scheme, there is an unique player called dealer who 
wants to share the secret S among n players, P1,…,Pn. The dealer sends every player a share (denoted as si
to Pi) of the secret S in the way that any group of m or more players are able to reconstruct the secret 
together but no group of fewer than m players can. 
As to the specific implement method of secret sharing, researchers have provided sufficient choices to 
us. Here, we only give a sketch of two classic examples for reference. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [9] 
is the first and typical solution. It utilizes the fact that m points uniquely determine a (m-1)-degree 
polynomial. In the secret sharing phase, the dealer first chooses a random (m-1)-degree polynomial f(x),
such that f(0)=S, and then sends the shares to every player so that player Pi receives f(i). In the 
reconstruction phase, any m or more players together can recover S by reconstructing the polynomial 
through Language’s interpolation while any subset of size less than m players cannot. 
405Yi Sun et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 403 – 408W. Mei et al. / Procedia Engineering 00 (201 ) 00 –000 3
We also can just use the simple operation “+” to achieve our target by splitting S in the way that 
S=s1+s2+…+sm [11]. The dealer delivers si to Pi in the first phase of secret sharing and all participants 
calculate S=s1+s2+…+sm after they broadcast their shares in the reconstruction phase. In this process, si
can be produced in various ways such as choosing random number as si and assigning a value xi to a 
polynomial to get si. There are a great variety of routes to share a secret. We no longer list them one by 
one. 
3. Objective 
3.1. Model
In a group key transfer protocol, the mutually trusted KGC is in charge of generating the group key 
and transporting it to each member involved in related conversation. For every distribution, there is a 
registration process for the participants to subscribe key distribution service, which enables that KGC 
shares a secret with each legitimate user.  
Traditionally, KGC encrypts the randomly selected group key under the secret shared with each user 
during registration and then sends the ciphertext to all corresponding members separately. The encryption 
algorithm is the hard core to the confidentiality of group key. 
Inspired by Lein Harn and Changlu Lin [6], we attempt to take advantage of secret sharing in group 
key management protocol. We first magically adjust the existing secret sharing scheme to a one called 
derivative secret sharing scheme to replace encryption algorithm for optimizing the group key transfer 
protocol. And then, we let KGC broadcast related information to all participants at once rather than 
separate delivery. The result is wonderful. In our protocol, each user only needs to store one message 
during registration and conduct a simple computation by playing with itself during reconstruction rather 
than reconstructing an interpolating polynomial by cooperating with other users [6]. Moreover, we 
succeed in reducing storage cost and improving computation efficiency besides providing mutual 
authentication in the protocol. 
3.2. Goals 
Our protocol aims to meet the following three properties these requirements: (1) Key freshness: Key 
freshness requires that the group key distributed by KGC each time has never been used before. This 
property eliminates the threat from a compromised group key. That is, any group key that has been 
recovered before cannot cause any further damage to the following group communication. (2) Key
confidentiality: Key confidentiality is to protect the group key such that it can only be regained by the 
specified legitimate users. (3) Key authentication: Key authentication is to provide assurance to 
legitimate users that what they get is the right group key generated by KGC rather by an attacker. 
4. Our protocol 
Prototype of Secret Sharing 
Phase 1: Secret sharing
1. Dealer splits S into n parts: S=s1+s2+…+sn.
2. Dealer sends Pi the share si, i=1,2,…, n, respectively in a secure channel. 
Phase 2: Reconstruction
1. All Pi, i=1,2,…, n, broadcast their shares at the same time when they want to recover the secret; 
2. Pi regains S by computing S=s1+s2+…+sn.
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Here, users must cooperate with others by broadcasting their own shares to reconstruct the secret. 
However, we expect the least mutual dependence on others. Therefore, we make magic changes to the 
prototype and get the following derivative secret sharing scheme.  
Derivative Secret Sharing 
Phase 1: Secret sharing
1. Dealer splits S into two parts n times: S=s1+s1’=s2+s2’=…=sn+sn’.
2. Dealer sends Pi the share si’, i=1,2,…, n, respectively in a secure channel. 
Phase 2: Reconstruction
1. Dealer broadcasts the shares si, i=1,2,…, n, at once when users want to recover the secret; 
2. Pi regains S by computing S=s1+s1’.  
Obviously, the derivative secret sharing greatly reduces the mutual dependence on others. Taking the 
two issues, group key management and secret sharing, into consideration, it is not hard to find that the 
low dependence of the derivative secret sharing is just what we expect in centralized group key 
management protocol. Therefore, we can integrate the striking skills in secret sharing with group key 
distribution to produce fresh group key transfer protocols. Our protocol is just the fruit of the group key 
transfer protocol based on the derivative secret sharing. 
4.1. Our Protocol 
User registration: Each user is requested to login to KGC for subscribing the group key distribution 
service. During registration, KGC shares a secret si’ with each user Ui. In the following process, KGC 
keeps tracking the actions of all registered users and removing any unsubscribed users. 
Group key generation and distribution:
1. The initiator appeals for a group key distribution service by sending KGC {u1,u2,…,un}, which 
contains the identities of the registered users U1,U2,…,Un, in current session. 
2. KGC broadcasts the list of all participants according to the above received message as a response; 
3. Each member sends a random challenge ri, i=1,2,…,n, to KGC; 
4. KGC randomly selects S to generate the group key K=gS for current service and then invokes 
derivative secret sharing to split S into two parts n times such that S=s1+s1’=s2+s2’=…=sn+sn’. KGC then 
computes: Mi={g
si+ri,ui,H(ui,g
si+ri,si’,ri)}, i=1,2,…,n, and Auth=H(K,g
s1+r1,…,gsn+rn,u1,…,un,r1,…,rn). At last, 
KGC broadcasts {M1,…,Mn,Auth} at once; 
5. After receiving Mi and Auth, Ui firstly computes h=H(ui,g
si+ri,si’,ri), where g
si+ri and ui are from Mi,
si’ is the shared secret stored by Ui, ri is the public value. And then Ui checks whether or not h is equal to 
the corresponding part in Mi. If not, Ui aborts; if so, Ui then continues to compute K’=g
si’*gsi+ri/gri, Auth’= 
H(K’,gs1+r1,…,gsn+rn,u1,…,un,r1,…,rn) and checks whether or not K’ can satisfy the condition that Auth’ is 
identical to Auth. If so, then K’ is just right the group key K which is distributed by KGC. 
6. Each user Ui returns a value hi’=H(si’,K’,u1,…,un,r1,…,rn) to KGC. KGC computes hi=H(si’,K,u1,…, 
un,r1,…,rn) with its own si’ and K and checks whether or not hi’= hi. This review is to make sure that every 
user in current session has indeed obtained the right group key. 
Remark: In our protocol, we bring a special secret sharing scheme in the group key distribution. The 
advantages are obvious. Firstly, in our scheme, a legitimate user only needs to store one secret share 
which is produced during registration. Moreover, there is no need to update the existing secret share he 
owns in subsequent sessions he involved in. That is what we called “one time assign, many times apply”. 
This nice characteristic favors extending the application range of our protocol. More specifically, when 
there is any change such as adding or moving any user, the existing secret shares in precious protocols 
would be unavailable any longer. However, in our protocol, the secret shares users kept can be utilized 
permanently rather than changing with different group key since they have already existed before the 
407Yi Sun et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 403 – 408W. Mei et al. / Procedia Engineering 00 (201 ) 00 –000 5
generation of the group key. What’s more, to a user Ui, the cost of storage is much lower compared with 
others for he only needs to keep one message si’ in secret. In addition, a simple computation is enough for 
Ui, to achieve the group key by calculating K=g
si’*gsi+ri/gri.
5. Analysis 
In this section, we firstly classify adversaries into two types [6], outsider and insider. In a certain round 
of group key distribution, there is an authorized set consisted of defined legitimate users, which we call 
insiders. Relatively, the others except the authorized ones in this round are outsiders. We will discuss how 
our protocol meets the three security requirements mentioned in 3.2 and resists the two kinds of 
adversaries in detail as follows. 
5.1. The Three Security Requirements 
(1) Key Freshness: Key freshness is ensured by invoking KGC to randomly select the group key for 
each service request he receives. KGC checks the freshness of the group key with precious ones before 
distributing it at the beginning of every round of distribution. 
(2) Key Confidentiality: Key confidentiality is guaranteed by the derivative secret sharing scheme. 
From 5.1, we know that the threats to key confidentiality are from two aspects. To those unauthorized 
ones, any attempt to recover the group key is infeasible since the secret sharing scheme only allows the 
authorized users who own the shares (the secrets shared with KGC during registration) to reconstruct K.
To those dishonest members of the group, it is also impossible to grab any other member’s secret share. 
Specifically speaking, a dishonest inside party Pi tries to compute another inside party Pj’s secret shares. 
Due to sj’ is the secret for Pj and KGC generated during registration, it is secure in our assumption. Pi has 
no choice but to make an effort to gain sj for his desire. After KGC broadcasts messages publicly, Pi can 
easily get gsj by gsj+rj/grj. But it is impracticable to get sj through g
sj because of DLP. 
(3) Key Authentication: We employ a one way hash function to provide group authentication. In step 
4, KGC computes Auth=H(K,gs1+r1,…,gsn+rn,u1,…,un,r1,…,rn) and broadcasts it later. Since only the 
authorized group members and KGC know the right group key, adversaries cannot forge the hash value 
without being detected. Besides, we bring in random challenge in step 3 to effectively avoid replay 
attacks.
5.2. Outside and Inside Attacks 
(1) Outside Attacks: To an outside adversary, his motivation is to obtain the group key or share the 
group key with group members. In the following analysis, we can see that his conspire is just a bubble. 
There are two ways to endeavor for his desire. One is to make use of all information he can grasp from 
the broadcast channel between KGC and authorized users. He may try to reuse an overdue group key by 
replaying preciously recorded information of the overdue group key. However, in step 3, random 
challenge forcefully defeats the replay attack. We use fresh random numbers to invoke KGC to select 
different group key for a new round of group key distribution. The other way is to impersonate a group 
member to participate in the execution of the protocol. There is no problem to initiate a service request to 
KGC and obtain corresponding responses from KGC. However, he is still not able to recover the group 
key because the key can only be recovered by those members who shared secrets with KGC. In summary, 
our protocol is against the outside attacks. 
(2) Inside Attacks: To every inside user, what we expect is that they are able to reconstruct the group 
key but know nothing more extra information. For this purpose, we must ensure that the group key is 
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indeed distributed to all authorized users in this round. Apart from that, what we care about is the security 
on secret shares belonged to each member. Consequently, we must avoid inside adversaries to prevent 
others from knowing the key as well as getting others’ secret shares. For the former problem, although Pi
can forge a random rj’ to simulate another user Pj and receives corresponding response from KGC. But he 
cannot forge the return response H(sj’,K’,u1,…,un,r1,…,rn). Therefore, we don’t recognize that Pj has 
received K. Thus, the inside adversary is not able to prevent others getting the group key without being 
detected. For the latter problem, the secret sharing scheme based on DLP guarantees the security of the 
secret shares. For dishonest Pi, he cannot achieve sj’ from Pj directly. All he can utilize for reaching Pj’s
secret shares are the messages broadcasted between KGC and Pj, Mj={g
sj+rj,uj,H(uj,g
sj+rj,sj’,rj)} and rj. Now 
that Pi wants to get sj’ or sj, he has two choices, computing sj from g
sj+rj or sj’ from H(uj,g
sj+rj,sj’,rj). 
Obviously, given gsj+rj and rj, it is infeasible to compute sj (equivalent to compute sj from g
sj) because of 
DLP. If Pi chooses to calculate sj’ from H(uj,g
sj+rj,sj’,rj), this can be reduced to seek for the collision of the 
hash function H. Similarly, it is intractable. In summary, our protocol is against the inside attacks. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we present an efficient group key transfer protocol based on a special secret sharing 
scheme. The reconstruction of the group key can be completed by the user-self. We also succeed in 
reducing storage cost, improving computation efficiency and providing mutual authentication. The 
corresponding analysis has also been illustrated.  
Acknowledgement 
 This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61170270, 
61100203, 60873191, 60903152, 61003286, 60821001) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the 
Central Universities (Grant Nos. BUPT2011YB01, BUPT2011RC0505). 
References 
[1] H. Harney, C. Muckenhirn, and T. Rivers, Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Architecture, RFC 2094, July 1997. 
[2] A. Fiat and M. Naor, Broadcast Encryption, Proc. 13th Ann. Int’l Cryptology Conf. Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO’93), 
pp. 480-491, 1994. 
[3] R. Blom, An Optimal Class of Symmetric Key Generation Systems, Proc. Eurocrypt’84 Workshop Advances in Cryptology, 
pp. 335-338, 1984. 
[4] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, A. Herzberg, S. Kutten, U. Vaccaro, and M. Yung, Perfectly Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic 
Conferences, Information and Computation, vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 1-23, Oct. 1998. 
[5] G. Saze, Generation of Key Predistribution Schemes Using Secret Sharing Schemes, Discrete Applied Math., vol. 128, pp. 
239-249, 2003. 
[6] L. Harn, Changlu Lin, Authenticated Group Key Transfer Protocol Based on Secret Sharing, IEEE Transactions on 
Computers, vol. 59, no.6, pp. 842-846, June 2010. 
[7] KS. McCurley, The Discrete Logarithm Problem, Proc. of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 42, 1990. 
[8] G.R. Blakley, Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys, Proc. Am. Federation of Information Processing Soc. (AFIPS’79) Nat’l 
Computer Conf., vol. 48, pp. 313-317, 1979. 
[9] A. Shamir, How to Share a Secret, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, pp. 612-613, 1979. 
[10] M. Blum, How to Exchange (secret) Keys, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 1(2): 175-193, 1983. 
[11] G. Simmons, How to (really) Share a Secret, Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’88, Springer, 1990. 
